This paper deals with a bilateral accident situation in which victims
INTRODUCTION
The standard economic model of accidents and liability, in its simplest form, assumes a world of homogeneous populations of potential injurers and victims. Potential injurers are typically assumed to be identical in terms of benefits derived from the potentially harmful activity, costs of care, and wealth. Victims are also assumed to be perfectly interchangeable in all respects. 2 It is undeniable that in the real world many situations giving rise to accidents significantly depart from this restrictive set of assumptions. Both the injurer and the victim in a given accident may be drawn from heterogeneous populations of potential injurers, potential victims, and both. Some injurers derive larger, sometimes much larger, benefits than others from engaging in an activity which might result in harm to third parties.
Some injurers face larger, sometimes much larger, costs of taking care and adopting precautionary measures than others. Some injurers are wealthier, sometimes much wealthier, than others. These departures from the most basic set of assumptions have already been, to a large extent, substantially explored in the law and economics literature.
The heterogeneity of injurers in terms of their ability (and cost) to take care has been analyzed in economic terms, and the benefits and costs of using general and average standards of due care instead of individualized and subjective standards have been duly examined in previous work (Landes and Posner, 1987; Shavell, 1987; Schwartz, 1989; Miceli, 1997; Edlin 1998) . In this setting, Rubinfeld (1987) has argued in favor of sharing rules such as comparative negligence to achieve more efficient levels of self-selection by heterogeneous injurers. Similarly, wealth differences among injurers and their impact on liability rules have also been considered in the literature (Shavell, 1984; Arlen, 1992; Miceli and Segerson, 1995; Schmitz, 2000) .
3
The issues arising from victims' heterogeneity have received less attention in the literature. The most extensively considered source of victims' heterogeneity has been that related to the level of harm suffered by the victim. Part of the literature (for example, Landes and Posner (1987) , Miceli (1997) , and especially Kaplow and Shavell (1996) has analyzed the use of average versus individualized damage awards in the presence of heterogeneous victims in terms of their levels of harm resulting from an accident. Others have also considered heterogeneity on both sides, injurers and victims, in terms of the benefits they derive from their harm-resulting activities, and show the superiority of sharing rules over uniform negligence standards, and also that efficiency may require imposing punitive damages upon some injurers, or paying expected rewards to some victims for being involved in an accident (Emons, 1990a (Emons, , 1990b Emons and Sobel, 1991) .
To our knowledge, none of the previous contributions have focused, as we do, on the interaction of victim's and injurer's care, and on the observability of the type of victim by the injurer when adopting the level of care.
Victims, ostensibly, not only differ in terms of the harm they are likely to experience if an accident takes place, but also in their relative ability and cost of taking care. For some types of victims, several (or many, perhaps even all) measures that could be adopted to reduce the likelihood of an accident are more costly than for other types of victim. Let's think, for instance, of children (although other examples are possible, and even likely) compared to adults. Taking care is, for most activities in which the participant might be harmed, more costly for children than for adults. Refraining from running on the sidewalk, watching for oncoming autos before crossing the road, using equipment with strength and ability, or resisting the temptation to trespass on a premise that promises some excitement, is usually easier for adults than for children. For children under a certain age, and for some of those activities, even the most obvious precautionary measures can be prohibitively costly.
These differences in the costs of taking care carry over to the determination of the optimal levels of precaution. Other things being equal, the costlier the care for a given victim, the lower the optimal level of care should be. This is universally acknowledged by legal systems: The levels of care that legal systems require of minors are consistently lower than those required of adults. Even if still "general" or "objective," because it does not descend to the individual abilities and conditions of every single child, the due care standard for a child is that of reasonable care not for an adult, but for a typical child within that age range. Evidence of this attitude across legal systems (both common law and civil law systems) can be found in von Bar (1998) and Keeton (1984) .
In a bilateral accident setting, when care measures of injurers and victims are correlated (they are assumed to be substitutes), a lower optimal level of care for a given group within the population of potential victims increases the optimal level of care for the injurer. For this to be affected by legal rules, the issue of the observability by potential injurers of the type of potential victims becomes critical. This issue of the interaction of victims' heterogeneity, on the one hand, and levels of care of the injurer, on the other, and the role of observability of type of victim, and of verification by the courts of injurers' observations, have been largely unexplored in the previous law and economics literature on these issues, which has, explicitly or implicitly, restricted its scope to unilateral accidents, strict liability, sharing rules, or other aspects of the problem.
The goal of this paper is specifically to analyze the interaction between the levels of care of heterogeneous victims and the injurer under a negligence regime, and see how different legal implementation options can bring us closer or further from the optimal levels of care for victims and injurer, depending on the observation by injurers of the type of victim. This approximates the flavor of the literature on "soft" and "hard" information, and information disclosure. Our most important result is that, under conditions of imperfect observability, policies of complete trust and complete distrust by courts regarding observation reports by injurers lead to identical outcomes. Crucial for this equivalence result is the assumption of "hard" information (that is, that injurers can lie about the fact of having observed the victim's type, but, given that they have observed, they cannot lie concerning the type of victim observed). The importance of this informational assumption lies in the reduction in the scope of injurer's opportunism that it brings about. The result is that substantive standards, and not the "procedural" or verification policies (the choice between trust and distrust), are able, by themselves, to provide incentives for the behavior of the injurers.
The paper will be organized as follows: In section 2 we present the model and characterize the first best and the second best solutions. In section 3 we examine some of the basic implementation options using a negligence rule defining due care levels. Section 4 analyzes the optimal solutions and implementation options when the injurer can observe the victim type with some positive probability lower than one. Section 5 discusses the major implications of the model for the application of the negligence rule and compares them with existing rules and doctrines in different legal systems. We conclude by briefly discussing the scope and implications of the model. All proofs are relegated to a technical appendix.
THE MODEL
We study the standard bilateral accident setting in which both the behavior of a potential injurer and the behavior of a potential victim affect the likelihood of an accident, but we assume that there are different types of victims. In particular, we assume that there are two different types of victims  1 (low cost of care) and  2 (high cost of care). The ex ante probability of type  1 is , and the ex ante probability of  2 is 1 − . We assume that all the actors are risk neutral, and that it is costly for the injurer and the victim to take precautions. Let Cx be the injurer cost of the precaution effort x. We assume Cx ′  0 and Cx ′′  0. While the harm resulting from the accident is the same for the two types of victims, D, victim cost of the precaution effort y differs across types, Cy, . We assume  2   1 , and  0, and we assume that the injurer and the victim precaution efforts are substitutes ∂ 2 px,y ∂x∂y  0. We also assume that the legal system regulates behavior through the use of negligence rules implemented by the courts.
First-Best Solution
We start by characterizing the first best solution that minimizes social cost, assuming the injurer can observe the victim type before choosing his precautionary effort. x1,x2,y1,y2 min px 1 
The following lemma shows, as expected, that the first-best solution implies that the less able victim (the one with higher cost of effort) optimally exerts a lower level of care, which is fully intuitive given the higher cost of the  2 type of victim.
Given that, and as we are assuming that the injurer and victim precautionary efforts are substitutes, the next lemma follows as an immediate consequence of Lemma 1. It states that at the optimum the injurer exerts a higher precautionary effort when facing a high-cost victim.
Second-Best Solution
In the second-best solution, the injurer cannot observe the victim type, so he chooses the same kind of precautionary effort with respect to both types of victims.
x,y1,y2
Similarly to the first-best solution, and due to the cost difference between the two, the next lemma shows that in the second-best solution the less able victim exerts a lower level of precautionary effort.
The next lemma states that the second-best solution leads the injurer, as might be expected, to exert an intermediate level of precautionary effort. Moreover, this precautionary effort is increasing in the ex ante probability of facing a less able victim.
Finally, the next proposition compares the first and second best solutions, and states that, given that the injurer exerts an intermediate level of precautionary effort, and that the injurer and the victim precaution efforts are substitutes, the less able victim increases his precaution effort while the more able victim reduces his precaution effort.
Proposition (1) y 1 * *  y 1 * and y 2 * *  y 2 * .
Notice that the less able victims are better off in the first-best solution than in the second-best solution, since the injurer's effort towards them is reduced, and thus they are forced to increase care to make up for that reduction. Consequently, according to Proposition 2, if courts are able to set due care levels at the optimal level for each type of victim, the differentiated negligence rule can directly induce the first-best solution when the injurer can observe the victims' type prior to the adoption of care.
IMPLEMENTING SOLUTIONS WITH THE NEGLIGENCE RULE

Differentiated Negligence When Victim Type is Observable
Uniform Negligence When Victim Type is Not Observable
When the injurer is unable to observe the type to which the victim belongs, a differentiated negligence rule does not seem, in principle, an appealing alternative on efficiency grounds. A uniform negligence rule can do the trick in this case. If the negligence rules set a single required level of precaution effort _ x, which coincides with the second-best level of care for the injurer, the second-best solution is attainable. Now we cannot achieve the first best solution, since the injurer cannot observe the victim's type, but, as the next proposition shows, the simple uniform negligence rule just mentioned can implement the second-best optimum.
Proposition (3) If
_ x x * * , the uniform negligence rule implements the second-best solution.
IMPERFECT OBSERVATION OF VICTIM TYPE
The Benchmark Case
We now consider the case in which the injurer can observe the victim type with probability , this probability being common knowledge. We assume that victims do not know whether or not the injurer observes their type. 4 The efficient solution under these informational constraints is given by the following optimization problem, where x N is the intermediate effort exerted by the injurer when he does not observe the victim's type:
Notice that if   1 this problem coincides with the first-best solution, while if   0 the problem coincides with the second-best solution. The next lemma characterizes the solution of this problem.
The efficient solution under imperfect observability is characterized by victims' intermediate levels of care (labelled y 1 * N and y 2 * N ) between the first-best and the second-best solution. Given that, when the injurer observes the victim, he should take less care (x 2 * N ) when the victim is a high-cost victim, and higher care (x 1 * N ) when the victim is a low-cost victim, both compared with the first-best solution. Finally 
Court's Inability to Verify Observation and Injurer Opportunism
More realistically, in this subsection we will analyze the previous imperfect information setup incorporating unverifiability by Courts of the injurer's observation of the victim's type. 5 In particular, the setting can be characterized as a game with the following sequence of actions:
1. Courts set levels of due care.
2. Nature decides the types of the victims and whether or not injurers observe victim types.
3. Injurers and victims choose the level of care.
4. The accident takes place or not, according to the probabilities generated by the chosen levels of care.
5. In the case in which an accident materializes, the injurer submits a statement concerning observation of the victim's type, and the Court decides liability based on the statement (according to the policies of trust and distrust described below), the victim's type and the negligence rule. We assume that the injurer's information about the victim's type is "hard" information. 6 Roughly speaking, we mean by this term that the injurer can lie about having observed but not about the content of the observation. That is, the injurer can only hide his information by pretending that he did not observe the victim's type when he did. However, the injurer cannot lie regarding the type of victim he actually observed, and thus he cannot report that he observed a low-cost victim, when he in fact had observed a high-cost one, and vice-versa.
7 This assumption seems the more natural one in our setting, since in the case of an accident, the courts can always verify ex post the type of victim the injurer was actually facing.
We solve this game by backwards induction. We look first at the liability decision by courts, then we analyze the choice of care, and finally we study the optimal levels of due care set by the courts.
We assume that the courts could use a complex negligence regime comprising three levels of due care. A higher level of due care for injurers who observe a high-cost victim x 2 , a low level of due care for injurers who observe a low-cost victim x 1 , and an intermediate level of care for non-observing injurers x N . Given the previous results, it is clear that the optimal levels must satisfy x 1 ≤ x N ≤ x 2 . Therefore, in this scenario there is ample room for injurer's opportunistic behavior, given that he can observe a high-cost victim and later pretend (such that the courts cannot tell if it is true or false) that he has not observed the victim's type, in order to exert a lower level of effort and save precautionary costs. At first blush, what seems to be crucial in this setting is the policy that courts would adopt concerning the credibility of the injurers' statements. We consider that courts may follow two extreme and radically opposite policies:
1. A policy of complete trust towards statements made by injurers, or 2. A policy of complete distrust, whereby courts never give credit to statements by the injurer in those situations in which opportunism may play a role. Therefore, if the injurer claims that he did not observe the victim's type and the victim is actually a high-cost victim, courts would require compliance with the level of care corresponding to the high-cost victim. In other words, under the policy of distrust, courts would require for high-cost victims the level of care designed for them, independent of the observability of the victim's type.
is not going to exert the effort required for the high-cost victim when he in fact observes that the victim is high-cost. Consequently, the injurer will never exert more than the intermediate (non-observability) required level x N . Thus, injurers observing the victims' type, either low-or high-cost, have a dominant strategy: those observing low cost victims always choose x 1 and those observing high-cost victims always choose x N . Notice that following a policy of trust does not mean that courts are naive and ignore the possibility of opportunistic behavior by the injurer. When courts set levels of care they take into account that the injurer will behave opportunistically, and so, injurers who have observed high-cost victims will report that they did not observe victim's type at all. In fact, we will show that a policy of trust, assuming that courts are able to anticipate the injurers temptation to behave opportunistically under this policy, might be an optimal policy, maximizing social welfare given the informational constraint that courts cannot verify whether or not the injurer has observed the victim's type.
Contrary to the conventional asymmetric information settings, the incentive problem of the injurer not observing is more complicated than that of the informed injurers. Given our previous assumption that the courts set x 1 , x N , x 2 , and depending upon the parameters of the relevant populations, they can opt for three different strategies: exerting x 1 , x N , or an intermediate level between both of them, x ′ y, where x ′ y ∈ arg min1 − px, yD  Cx. 8 We characterize the conditions under which the uninformed injurer chooses among them.
1. The uninformed injurer exerts x 1 if the vector x 1 , x N , y 2  satisfies the following condition:
The second part of the condition tells us that the injurer prefers to exert the low level of effort, x 1 , taking the risk of paying damages if he faces a high-cost victim rather than to exert the intermediate level of effort x N (set by the courts, and in practice the highest level of effort required, given the policy of trust), and thus avoid paying any damages. The first part of the condition excludes the adoption of an intermediate level of care between x 1 and x N . We denote by H 1 the set of vectors (x 1 , x N , y 2  satisfying this condition.
The uninformed injurer exerts x
′ y if the vector (x 1 , x N , y 2  satisfies the following condition:
The second part of the condition tells us that the injurer prefers to exert the intermediate level of effort, x ′ y 2 , taking the risk of paying damages if he faces a high-cost victim rather than to exert the intermediate level of effort x N . The first part of the condition shows that, given the injurer is liable towards high-cost victims, he prefers to increase the level of care above x 1 to reduce the probability of accident. We denote by H 2 the set of vectors (x 1 , x N , y 2  satisfying this condition.
3. The uninformed injurer exerts x N if the vector (x 1 , x N , y 2  satisfies one of the two conditions:
That is, the injurer prefers to exert the intermediate level of effort x N set by the courts, and thus avoid paying any damages, rather than to exert a lower x 1 , or some intermediate level between x 1 and x N , paying damages in case of an accident with a high-cost victim. We denote by H 3 the set of vectors satisfying one or the other of the above conditions. These three strategies give rise to three different equilibria. In order to characterize the optimal levels of care which should be set by courts, we characterize the optimal levels of care for each of the equilibria. Thus, we are going to minimize social cost, introducing an additional incentive constraint such that the levels of care x 1 , x N , y 2  induce non-informed injurers to exert a particular level of care. Finally, by comparing the social cost of the optimal levels of care in each equilibrium we will be able to find the optimal solution. We start by characterizing the optimal level of care for each of the three different equilibria.
The first is a partial pooling equilibrium in which injurers who do not observe the victim type pool with those observing the low-cost victims. Then, the efficient levels of care under this equilibrium will be the solution to the following problem. 
Besides the incentive compatibility constraint, this problem mirrors the problem in the benchmark non-observability case, with the additional constraint that there are only two independent levels of care, since injurers who do not observe victim type will exert the same care as those observing the low-cost victims. Thus, it is clear that social welfare with these levels of care has to be lower than in the benchmark case of courts' perfect verifiability of injurers' observations.
The next lemma characterizes the solution of this problem
The efficient solution under this equilibrium (labelled in this case as NE) is characterized by a level of care for the injurer in the case of unobservability or in the case of facing a low-cost victim, intermediate (x 1 * NE ) between the optimal one in the benchmark case for unobservable victims x N * N  and the optimal one for the low-cost victim x 1 * N . Given this intermediate level of the injurer, the optimal level of care for the low-cost victim is lower than in the benchmark case y 1 * N  y 1 * NE . For the high-cost victim, in turn, this implies a higher level of care than in the benchmark case y 2 * N  y 2 * NE , which in turn leads to a lower level of care under the trust policy towards the high-cost victims x N * NE  x 2 * N . Therefore, this optimal solution clearly yields winners and losers compared to the benchmark case. Low-cost victims and injurers observing high-cost victims, both gain from the policy, whereas high-cost victims and those injurers observing low-cost victims lose.. The effect on injurers who do not observe the victim's type is ambiguous.
The second equilibrium is a separating equilibrium in which injurers who do not observe the victim type choose an intermediate level of care between x 1 , chosen by injurers observing low-cost victims, and x N , chosen by injurers observing high-cost victims. Thus, the efficient levels of care under this equilibrium, will be the solution to the following problem:
It would be tempting to think that with this separating equilibrium one could mimic the benchmark case, simply by choosing x 1  x 1 * N and x N  x 2 * N . However, this outcome is not achievable, since uninformed injurers choose their privately optimal level of care, x ′ y 2 , taking into account just the high-cost victims, the only ones for whom they are liable, and not all victims as in the benchmark case. Besides x ′ y 2 , the characterization of the optimal levels of this equilibrium closely resemble the previous case.
Finally, the third equilibrium is also a partial pooling equilibrium in which uninformed injurers pool with those observing high-cost victims. Then, the efficient levels of care under this equilibrium, will be the solution to the following problem:
Since this problem mirrors the problem in the benchmark non-observability case, with the constraint x 2  x N , it is clear that the welfare now has to be lower than in the benchmark case. The following lemma characterizes the solution to this problem 
.
Therefore, the optimal solution under this equilibrium yields clear winners and losers compared to the benchmark case. Low-cost victims and injurers observing high-cost victims both gain from the policy, whereas high-cost victims and the rest of injurers (those encountering low-cost victims and those not observing their high-cost counterpart) lose.
One can also quite simply characterize the probability of opportunism conditioned on the courts receiving an unobservability statement by the injurer when the victim is high-cost. By Bayes' rule this probability is equal to .
The last step is to compare the optimal solution under each equilibrium in order to identify the global solution, that is the set of levels of care (x 1 * NGS , x N * NGS , y 2 * NGS , y 1 * NGS ) that minimizes the social cost of accidents, given the non-verifiability by courts of the injurer's observation of the victim's type. It is unclear which of the equilibria analyzed provides a higher social surplus. It depends on the parameters of the population and on the probability of observation of the victim's type. On the one hand, it seems that if  is large, then the probability of opportunistic behavior on the part of the injurer is high, and thus the first or second of the equilibria is likely to produce higher social surplus. On the other hand, when the proportion of high-cost victims is large, the third equilibrium is likely to provide more surplus, since it avoids the inefficiency arising from the uninformed injurer choosing the low level of care. 
The opposite policy of distrust
Under a policy of complete distrust, courts do not believe the injurer's statement claiming that he did not observe the victim's type when the victim is a high-cost victim. There is no room, thus, for the informed injurer to behave opportunistically. As in the previous case, the informed injurer has a dominant strategy: choose x 1 when observing a low-cost victim, and choose x 2 when observing a high-cost victim. The uninformed injurer can also opt for three different strategies exerting x 1 , x 2 or an intermediate level between both of them, x ′ y. The intermediate level, x N , will not play as such any role in this case, since it is only useful for avoiding liability when the victim is a low-cost victim, and in this case, the informed injurer would prefer to save care costs by exerting x 1 . Hence, the choice of x N is dominated by x 1 and, consequently, x N is not going to be played in equilibrium. The following proposition describes the optimal levels of care and the welfare achieved.
Proposition (4) The optimal levels of care under a policy of distrust coincide with the optimal levels of care under a policy of trust, replacing x N * NGS by x 2 * NGS . Thus, policies of trust and distrust both generate the same expected social cost.
The idea behind this proposition is that the difference between the trust and distrust policies is simply a question of labeling the higher level of care imposed by courts as x 2 or x N . Contrary to intuition, and given that the labeling of the choice variable is of no consequence, the same outcome can be achieved using either the trust policy or the distrust policy. Both policies generate the same equilibria and payoffs, thus making irrelevant the choice by courts of rules concerning the credibility of the injurers' statements.
11 To better capture the logic of the argument, let's consider first that  is very close to 1, that is, that the likelihood that an injurer has not observed the victim's type is negligible, so the behavior of non-observing injurers has very little impact on social welfare. Under a policy of trust, injurers observing a high-cost victim would choose x N , and under a policy of distrust they would choose x 2 . Courts can then employ the same substantive standard, setting x N (under a policy of trust)  x 2 (under a policy of distrust), and induce the same behavior under both policies, and consequently, identical welfare outcomes. Second, when uninformed (non-observing) injurers are relevant, given that under both policies their behavior is driven by the difference between the lower and the higher standards that are, in fact, applied, again the same logic appears. The same incentive scheme is achievable under the trust policy as under the policy of distrust simply when the distance between the relevant standards in the first case (distance between x 1 and x N ) is set by the courts at the same level as in the second case (distance between x 1 and x 2 ).
Notice that for this equivalence result, the assumption of "hard" information is crucial; that is, injurers can lie about observing or not, but they cannot lie about the content of the observation. This assumption reduces the scope of injurer's opportunism, and allows the substantive standards, and not the "procedural" or verification policies (the choice between trust and distrust), to carry all of the weight in providing incentives for the behavior of the agent. We believe that our assumption of "hard" information is the most plausible, given our setting of heterogeneous victims, whose type, one can confidently think, courts should be able to assess after the accident, at least in most cases.
Things would be different under alternative informational assumptions. On the one hand, if the type of victim were unverifiable ex post accident, it is difficult to imagine how a policy of distrust might be implemented, since there is no way to effectively reduce the opportunism of injurers. In this case, using a policy of trust will mean that all injurers would report having faced a low-cost victim. The best reaction by the courts would then be setting a single care standard equal to the second-best. On the other hand, if the type of victim were verifiable ex post, but it were possible, in principle, for the injurer to pretend to have observed a low-cost victim both when he did not observe the type and when he did observe a high-cost victim, the equivalence result would also collapse. The distrust policy would produce the same outcomes as under the "hard" information assumption, given that it eliminates all possibility of opportunistic behavior in reporting by injurers. Now the trust policy is the one that makes no sense, both because it would sacrifice all the efficiency gains obtained by the possibility of observation, and because the chance of opportunism is so huge for the injurer that the best reaction of the court would be to set care standards so as to lead all potential injurers to the second-best solution.
In our model, reports by injurers to the courts are not informative, in the sense that they do not increase the accuracy of judicial decisions. This distinguishes our approach from that of both the literature on evidence production at trial (for example, Sanchirico, 1997 ) and on mechanism design with endogenous revelation of information (for example, Bull and Watson, 2004) .
We conjecture that our results could find application in other settings in which a principal has to provide behavioral incentives to an agent, based in part on the agent's observation of the state of the world, or of the behavior of a third party. An example of such a scenario could be that of the optimal liability or sanctioning regime imposed on gatekeepers, such as lawyers or auditors, or intermediate regulatory agencies, when there is an underlying misconduct on the part of their clients or the regulated firms.
IMPLICATIONS FOR APPLICATION OF THE NEGLIGENCE RULE IN LEGAL SYSTEMS
It is a general feature of most legal systems that some easily identifiable categories of persons are subject to less stringent standards of due care than the average person. Probably the clearest example of this differentiated treatment is given by the standards of care to which children are subject. Given their lower psychological disposition and ability to take care, children don't need to adopt the precautions that the average citizen would need to take in order to comply with the requirements of the negligence rule, but just those of ordinary kids of their age and experience. (von Bar, 1998:98) and also in the English and Nordic legal systems (von Bar, 1998:343) . In German law, for instance, § 828 BGB sets differential liability standards for kids, according to age (for one, there is no care requirement below seven years of age), type of activity, and personal and intellectual maturity 12 (Oechsler, 2003) . In French law, however, the traditional differential standard for children, based on the notion of their "discernment," seems to have almost collapsed after several decisions by the French Cour de Cassation in the mid-1980s effectively making their situation almost indistinguishable from that of adults in many respects (Lebreton, 1999; Carbonnier, 2000) . In the Spanish legal system, the Supreme Court has consistently (or almost) denied that naughty, irreflexive, careless actions by children constitute negligent behavior that might be considered under contributory or comparative negligence rules. It is true, though, that some cases of reckless disregard of danger, let alone criminal conduct, by minors, have led to reductions or outright denial of liability due to contributory or comparative negligence (Ferrer and Ruisánchez, 1999) .
In the US legal system, the Restatement of the Law Third, Torts: General Principles, provides as a general rule for children in § 8: "When the actor is a child, the actor's conduct is negligent if it does not conform to that of a reasonably careful person of the same age, intelligence and experience..." When, as is usually the case, children (or other types of victim with higher cost of care) are the victims in an accident, how does this affect the required levels of care for the injurers involved?
Simultaneous Accidents Where Victim Type is Observable
In section 3 we showed that when the type of victim is observable by the injurer, the first-best solution is implementable through a rule that imposes upon the injurer differentiated levels of due care depending on the type of victim: a higher level of care when encountering victims with higher costs of care, and a lower one when facing a victim belonging to the group having lower costs of care.
This kind of implementation mechanism is precisely what one observes in most real-world legal systems through the use of the negligence rule. The Caution, Children Crossing / 381 negligence rule discriminates among standards of injurer care on the basis of the type of victim, when the former is in a position to know the type of victim when deciding about the level of care.
Thus, for injurers dealing ordinarily with less able types of victims (children, physically or mentally handicapped persons), the standard of care is substantially higher than that applied to injurers engaging in the same kind of activity, but ordinarily not interacting with such groups of victims. Just to give an example: the Spanish Civil Code and the Spanish Supreme Court apply very different standards of care to educators dealing with minors (in primary or secondary institutions) than to university professors, who usually encounter young adults rather than children in the course of their educational activities (Ferrer and Ruisánchez, 1999; Durany, 1999) .
Even when interactions with the type of victim having higher costs of care is uncommon, or merely casual, most legal systems still provide for enhanced duties of care correlated to the type of victim encountered, when the injurer observed, or could have observed, the victim's type. The injurer has to take additional precautions to counteract the lower level of care expected from that particular type of victim, and failure to do so involves negligence and a corresponding liability for the harm caused to the less able victim (Seidelson, 1981; Prosser and Keeton, 1984; von Bar, 1998) . When children, for instance, are in the vicinity, their sometimes impulsive and thoughtless behavior has to be anticipated by the potential injurer and, thus, enhanced vigilance and caution is required to escape liability (enhanced care that would not be imposed upon injurers in the presence of an adult as victim). In a very recent Spanish case, a 14-year old musician died when electrocuted by the bass amplifier of the orchestra in which he was playing. The Spanish Supreme Court affirmed the liability of the owner of the orchestra, stressing the increased duties of supervision and care towards the teenager, due to his age and lack of experience (STS, 1ª, 7.10.2004 (La Ley nº 6130) .
This attitude is again consistent with the attainment of first-best efficiency in a world of observable victim's type. The fact that the injurer does not commonly encounter that particular type of victim, and that she is used to dealing with other types of victim does not make the adoption by the negligence rule of a special and increased standard of care in these circumstances less attractive on efficiency grounds.
Simultaneous Accidents Where Victim Type is Not Observable
Things are more complicated in legal terms also when the victim's type is not readily observable by the injurer. It is indisputable that in the population of potential victims, the presence of some individuals having higher costs of care drives up the optimal level of care with respect to the level that would have been optimal in the face of a homogeneous pool of victims. Most legal systems seem sensitive to changes in the likely composition of the pool of potential victims, at least partially along lines that the model presented in section 2 shows to be consistent with the pursuit of second-best efficiency. For instance, the increased probability of the presence or proximity of children seems to push up the standard of care necessary to avoid being held negligent. Drivers are usually informed by adequate warnings that they are approaching a school area, and thus, that the pool of pedestrians who might suffer an accident contains a higher percentage of children than the average neighborhood of the city. All legal systems require extra care from drivers entering an area covered by such a warning. In our model, it is efficient to increase the required level of precautions when 1 −  (the fraction of high-cost victims in the population of potential victims) increases.
Similarly, when 1 −  goes down in a certain setting, so does the optimal level of care on the part of the potential injurer, and so should the due care standard. For instance, when the pool of potential victims is less likely to contain children, or other groups of high-cost victims, the desirable level of care of those carrying on the eventually harmful activity decreases. This finding seems to give theoretical support to the adult-activity doctrine in tort law.
13 This doctrine operates as an exception to the general rule that children are subject to a different and less stringent standard of care than adults. If children engage in so-called adult activities, they are held to the adult standard of behavior. In those activities in which typically one does not encounter children (say, driving, or motor-boat racing), potential injurers expect 1 −  to be zero, and therefore, that all potential victims are low-cost ones. An increase in the injurer's required level of precaution makes no sense here.
It is clear, moreover, that activities in which the participation of the high-cost victims is legally prohibited (like driving for small children or blind persons) due to the overall dangerousness of its consequences when executed with little care, are obvious candidates for the application of this doctrine.
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Even without specific signals, it seems that the likely increased presence of potential victims with higher costs of care suffices to justify the adoption of more stringent standards of due care for potential injurers (Keeton, 1984:200) . Some commentators defend the decision to impose this extra burden of precaution on potential injurers on fairness grounds: those who Caution, Children Crossing / 383 face higher costs of care have the right to engage in activities that allow them to lead independent and enjoyable lives. Children, some argue, have the right to explore the world and develop as human beings through recurrent interaction with fellow children, adults, and the rest of the outside world in a substantially unrestrained and spontaneous manner. At least for certain activities, this right to self-sufficiency, or to self-development, would arguably justify the extra cost of care that they impose on potential injurers through increased levels of care under the negligence rule (Keating, 2002; Ferrer and Ruisánchez, 1999) .
It is less clear, though, that the use of more stringent levels of care for populations of victims with a higher fraction of less able people is totally consistent with our characterization of second-best efficiency. The implementation of second-best in our model would, in its simplest form, require a rule mandating in every case a standard of care that is intermediate between the first-best optimal towards victims with low costs of care and the first-best optimal towards high-care victims. It is doubtful that this is really what courts do in most cases, given that there is little evidence that the likely presence of children effectively elevates the standard of care in those cases in which the actual victim was a low-cost victim (an adult), and not a high-cost one. Moreover, the direct implementation of the second-best would imply that high-cost victims would be induced to adopt a higher level of care than their first-best optimal, given that the injurer is complying with the intermediate and required level of care as injurer. Nothing of this kind appears mentioned in the literature, nor when dealing with contributory and comparative negligence do the cases contemplate any increase in the levels of care of less able victims in a bilateral accident with unobservable victim's type.
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Some commentators, moreover, appear to criticize the amalgamation of adults and children to determine a kind of average level of care (even if it is done, as is the case here, to indirectly fix the level of care of a potential injurer facing both types of victim) (Landes and Posner, 1987) .
In some areas of the law, one could advance the explanation that the attainment of the second-best is far from being the motivation behind the rules implemented by the courts. Even when observation of the victim's type seems hardly possible, courts could still be using differentiated negligence rules based on the victim's type. So, when the person harmed by the defendant in a given case is a high-cost victim, the level of care required from the injurer under the negligence rule is the high level that was optimal for that type of victim (but not for the pool of high-and low-cost victims), whereas when the plaintiff is a low-cost victim, the standard of care that the negligence rule would impose on the injurer is the lower level that was optimal for that type of victim, but not for the pool.
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This attitude is particularly noticeable in the field of tort liability of owners or occupiers of land. The traditional common law rule is that landowners owe no duty of reasonable care to trespassers, and thus, if a trespasser suffers harm as a result of the trespass, the owner or possessor will not be liable. The level of care of the landowner towards the so-to-speak "low-cost trespasser" is low (in fact, at least in principle, zero). The legal situation differs widely when the trespasser is a child. In this case, when the landowner knew or had reason to know that child trespassers were likely, the landowner owes a duty of care to the child trespasser. That is, when the potential injurer knew or could have known about the non-insignificant presence of high-cost victims among the population of potential trespassers, the standard of care towards them is high (positive, instead of zero).
17 Curiously enough, under Spanish law, the rule, although less clearly stated, is very similar. The Spanish Supreme Court, in several rulings, has determined that the owners of abandoned dangerous premises (usually, mines or industrial sites) are required to adopt adequate measures that would avoid harm to inexperienced or irreflexive persons (read: children), and would be liable in tort if failing to do so (Ferrer and Ruisánchez, 1999) . Comparable cases involving adult intruders in the premises would receive a substantially different solution.
Notice that in these cases, in order to impose upon the injurer the increased duty of care in the face of less able victims, courts do not require observability of the victim's type (in most cases, the landowner is entirely unaware of the trespass), simply that the potential injurer knows, or has reason to know, that there are high-cost potential victims. In other words, courts diversify the level of due care on the basis of the victim's type despite its apparent unobservability.
It is clear from our results in the preceding sections that this rule is less desirable on efficiency grounds than a rule that simply and directly implements the second-best solution with a uniform level of due care for the injurer equal to the second-best optimal precautionary effort. But a case can be made for other factors alien to efficiency justifying the use of the differentiated standard of care even for apparently non-observable victim types. If the goal of the legal system is to satisfy some kind of Rawlsian preference in favor of the welfare of the less well-off (here, by hypothesis, the group of victims with high costs of care), a differentiated standard for the injurer based on the type of victim actually encountered might, under the conditions referred to in the above note, constitute an attractive policy alternative. On fairness grounds, the use by courts of a uniform negligence rule irrespective of the type of victim actually encountered by the plaintiff in the tort suit might be considered by many as unfair. One could argue that the uniform rule provides injurers and victims with lower costs of care the opportunity to free-ride on the higher costs of care of other groups of potential victims. The presence of the latter groups allows the more able ones to save costs of care because they can anticipate that the potential injurer would adopt more precautions under the uniform rule 100% of the time (remember, type is unobservable for the injurer) precisely because there are less able victims in the pool. Injurers, for their part, incur costs of care with respect to all types of victims lower than the first-best optimal ones with respect to the group of victims with higher costs of care. Moreover, the uniform negligence rule forces the latter group of potential victims to increase their levels of precaution, in anticipation of the lower care that potential injurers will adopt in front of the whole population of victims.
If one considers the typical groups with recognizably higher costs of care (children, mentally or physically impaired persons) than many others-including many courts-these effects might strike them as unfair. And some might even advocate that the welfare of these groups that deserve special protection by society and the legal system is well worth the price of some inefficiency in the functioning of tort law.
It can be shown that, in general, the use of a differentiated negligence rule based on the victim's type, although less than optimal in terms of the attainment of second-best efficiency, appears to improve in all cases the lot of the high-cost victims compared with the uniform rule immediately implementing the second-best optimum.
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A different kind of explanation, though, could be offered for the observed pattern of legal rules actually favored by courts. This pattern is consistent with efficiency if courts believe (and this is not an unreasonable belief) that zero observability is impossible to discern from imperfect observability. Coupled with the fact that actual observation by the injurer in a given case cannot be verified by courts, we are fully in the world of section 4 of the paper. In this setting, we have shown that efficiency calls for differentiated negligence rules, and that equilibrium behavior by injurers under this efficiency-oriented differentiated regime would be indistinguishable from the one induced by the fairness-inspired negligence regime (though victims would take zero care in the latter, but not in the former).
We don't have enough evidence about the motivations of courts to use the differentiated rule in various accident settings to allow us to conclude which is the most convincing explanation behind the use of differentiated rules by courts in accidents in which observation of the victim's type seems hardly feasible. Maybe they are not mutually exclusive, and there is a combination of fairness and efficiency forces leading to the observed choice of courts in different legal systems.
EXTENSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
That potential accident victims are heterogeneous in terms of their costs of care is a fact of life. Some victims face higher costs of taking care than others. In this paper we have explored the implications of this heterogeneity for the functioning of the negligence rule.
In our approach we have opted for a model of two types of victim, differing in their costs of care. The extension of the model to a larger number of types would be trivial. We have decided not to extend the model with continuous types of victims, mainly for two reasons. First, it would essentially replicate the findings and implications of the discrete two-types model. Second, from a law and economics perspective, a continuous type setting would not adequately capture the actual perspective of the legal system, in which no consideration is given to each individual standard of care, but instead, broad (extremely broad, one could say, or even just one) categories are built in order to define standards of due care. In the law, standards of care are always general and average, and not made-to-measure. Information costs would be otherwise intractable (Landes and Posner, 1987) .
Our model is also built upon the assumption that there is substitutability between care by victims and injurers. This is the most common assumption in the law and economics literature on bilateral accidents. It could be possible to extend our model to the case of complementarity between the corresponding care efforts of injurers and victims. The basic results of our model would then be reversed, because it would be optimal for injurers to exercise more care with respect to low-cost than with respect to high-cost victims. We believe, though, that the complementary case is of less relevance for the operation of liability rules in real-world legal systems.
Our basic results could also be extended in a straightforward manner to the case of heterogeneous injurers, whose type could then be observed or not by the victim. As indicated in the discussion of the literature in the introduction, this setting has been extensively analyzed, with little treatment, however, of the observability issues that we emphasize in our model. Other areas of tort law, such as the expanding liability of gatekeepers, seem to us promising cases for the use of the relationship between standards of care and observability issues.
To summarize the main results of our paper: we characterize first-best efficient levels of care for the injurer and both types of victims. We also characterize the second-best levels of care, which cannot be improved upon when injurers cannot observe the victim's type in deciding which level of precaution they will adopt. Turning to the effects of the negligence rule on the adoption of care, we consider a uniform and a differentiated (based on the actual victim's cost of care) negligence rule, both of which seem to be in use in different legal systems. When the injurer can observe the victim's type, first-best results can be achieved using a differentiated rule. When this is not the case, a uniform negligence rule with due care set as the second-best optimal care for the injurer implements the second-best. The differentiated rule cannot do the trick, and is thus less efficient than the uniform rule in an unobservable victim situation. We also analyze imperfect (as distinct from perfect or none at all) observation of the victim's type. We characterize the optimal solution in this setting, and examine the different legal alternatives when courts cannot verify the injurers' statements concerning whether they had or had not observed the victim before taking care. Counterintuitively, we show that there is no difference at all between the use by courts of a rule of complete trust and a rule of complete distrust towards the injurers' statements. Optimally set standards of care can carry all the weight to provide injurers with incentives to take care in the presence of heterogeneous victims. We finally discuss the actual use of several rules and doctrines in various legal systems, employing the results of the model as our theoretical framework. Specifically, we discuss how the departure from efficiency through the use of a differentiated rule in situations of practical unobservability might respond to a preference for the welfare of high-cost victims at the expense of second-best efficiency, or might be consistent with efficiency tied to our results in the imperfect observability setting.
This is because, 
Applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain
Then, using that x * * ∈ x 1 * , x 2 * , we can conclude that y 1 * *  y 1 * and y 2 * *  y 2 * .
Proof of Proposition 2
We denote by x i DL the precaution effort of the injurer when facing a victim of type i. There are two cases 1. First, we consider that x i DL ≥ x i * . In this case, the injurer is not liable and consequently he does not have to compensate the victim for any harm. Therefore, the injurer will never choose a precaution effort larger than x i * when he observes that the type of victim is i. If the injurer exerts a precaution effort of x i * , the optimal response of the victim will be y i Now we show that the injurer prefers case 1 to case 2. This is because the first-best solution maximizes the total surplus (minimizes social cost), and with the first-best the victim is worse off (he has an expected cost of px i * , y i * D  Cy i * ,  i  than in the case in which x i DL  x i * (the victim does not bear any costs). Therefore, if the total surplus is larger in the first-best solution and the surplus of the victim is lower, the injurer necessarily has a larger surplus with the first-best solution.
Proof of Proposition 3
We denote by x L the precaution effort of the injurer. There are two cases: Now we show that the injurer prefers case 1 to case 2. This is because the second-best solution maximizes the total surplus, and with the second-best the victim is worse off (has an expected cost of px * * , y i * * D  Cy i * * ,  i  than in the case in which x L  x * * (victim does not bear any cost). Therefore, if the total surplus is larger in the second-best solution and the surplus of the victim is lower, the injurer necessarily has a larger surplus with the second-best solution.
Proof of Lemma 5
For the same argument used in the proof of Lemma 1, y 1 * N  y 2 * N . Provided that y 1 * N  y 2 * N and using the same argument used in the proof of Lemma 2, we obtain that By the same token, 
Proof of Lemma 6
Similar argument to the one used in the proof of Lemma 5.
Proof of Lemma 7
Proof of Proposition 4
Straightforward from the discussion following the proposition in the main text.
12. It is debated among German legal scholars whether the level of maturity should be evaluated on an individual, or on a more aggregate or standardized basis (age group or other typical factors). 13. For a discussion of this doctrine and the boundaries of the adult-activity notion, see Keeton (1984) , and Dobbs (2000) . 14. Some commentators argue for a broader use of the adult standard for children, restricting the more lenient one to those carefree activities necessary for childhood socialization and development (Forell, 1985) . 15. In the simple world of our model, liability rules are implicitly assumed to operate perfectly, and thus the negligence rule, unaccompanied by contributory or comparative negligence, is able, on its own, to do the trick of inducing efficient levels of care both for the injurer and the victim, since direct implementation of the second-best in this setting dos not require paying attention to the victim's care level. The reality that in the actual cases there are almost no traces of the increased level of care of the high-cost victims may be interpreted, though, as indirect evidence of the fact that courts are not trying to use a negligence rule that mimics the direct implementation of the second-best. 17. A complete account of the American cases can be found in Keeton (1984:393) and Dobbs (2000:592) . 18. As we mention in endnote 16, the use of a differentiated negligence rule when the injurer cannot observe the victim type can generate three equilibria. In one equilibrium, the injurer chooses the level of care that is required towards high-cost victims. As this level of care should be higher than the second best solution, the level of welfare of the less able victims under the differentiated negligence rule is higher than under the uniform rule directly implementing the second-best. In the other two equilibria, the injurer neglects totally or partially the presence of the high-cost victims, and opts for a level of precaution that make him always liable towards high-cost victims alone. As injurers are always found negligent when the victim is high-cost, and the latter will always be compensated, high-cost victims will be induced to incur no costs of care. If (a big if, though) damages paid by the injurer always cover the harm suffered by the victim, the welfare of high-cost victims (though not social welfare) is maximized with the use of the differentiated negligence rule: they have zero costs of care and they are indifferent, because of the damage payment, between the occurrence and non-occurrence of an accident. Moreover, if the second-best level of care of potential victims was already close to zero (which seems plausible for certain accident settings given the cost functions of at least some groups of less able victims), the inefficiency arising from the differentiated rule is relatively small, and might, at least by some, be considered an affordable price to pay in order to maximize the welfare of children or other disadvantaged groups of potential victims.
